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3Abstract
This paper investigates the impact of trade openness on wage and job 
quality outcomes in the Egyptian manufacturing sector over a period of 
rapid trade liberalization. We utilize newly available panel labor market 
survey data for 1998–2006, merge it (at the two-digit industry level) with 
trade variables that capture export orientation, import penetration as well 
as direct policy change relating to reduction of average tariffs, and use the 
merged data set to estimate a two-stage inter-industry wage and job qual-
ity premia model. Our results highlight that institutional factors of job 
quality (social security, medical insurance, a contract, paid casual leave, 
paid sick leave, and whether the worker is a member of a trade union) have 
the strongest correlation with the trade variables and the industry-specific 
characteristics used in the analysis. Tariff reduction per se, does not seem 
to have had a significant impact on either wages or job quality over this 
period. On the other hand, increased export orientation exerts a strong 
positive impact on wages, but a significant negative impact on all job 
quality indices in many specifications. Finally, industries with the highest 
import penetration levels have the lowest job quality, but those that had 
the largest increase in import penetration actually also saw large improve-
ments in job quality. The above results underscore the clear distinction 
between wage and job quality outcomes in the Egyptian labor market, and 
the importance of separating the two when examining the effect of trade 
policy on labor.
1. Introduction
One of the most distinguishing features of the current phase of global 
integration is the wide-spread adoption of trade liberalization and open-
ness to foreign markets through high reductions in tariffs and non-tariff 
barriers in the developing world. A controversy has followed, however, on 
the potential growth and distributional benefits and perils of such strate-
gies, as predominantly reflected in labor market outcomes. In particular, 
the impact of trade openness and decline in protection on wage inequal-
ity and employment outcomes in countries that engaged in such a course 
4has been thoroughly studied.1 By contrast, very few studies attempted to 
measure the impact of such policies of the quality on new jobs created as 
a result of openness. Although there is no empirical evidence that sup-
ports the correlation between trade openness and changes in job quality, 
it is claimed that increased foreign competition, mainly in developing 
countries, leads to an expansion of the informal sector because it is the for-
mal sector that is exposed to more foreign competition compared to the 
informal sector, and that the formal sector attempts to cut costs by opt-
ing for temporary or part-time workers or laying off workers who then opt 
for informal jobs (Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003)). For example, the study 
by Currie and Harrison (1997) on Morocco shows that firms started hiring 
more temporary workers after the completion of a comprehensive trade 
liberalization program. 
This paper will employ a newly available panel labor market survey to 
investigate the above claim for Egypt over the period of rapid trade liber-
alization between 1998 and 2006. Egypt’s concerted efforts to liberalize a 
highly restrictive trade regime since the early 1990s, has resulted in sub-
stantial reduction in both nominal and effective protection in almost all 
manufacturing sector industries. Besides representing the first attempt to 
directly estimate the impact of trade liberalization measures on wage and 
non-wage outcomes in the Egyptian labor market, our study will go beyond 
previous literature on this topic in two important ways. First, in order to 
arrive at adequate measures of trade openness and protection at the indus-
try level we will merge labor market survey data at the two-digit industry 
level with trade measures that capture export promotion and import pen-
etration, as well as direct policy change relating to reduction of average 
tariffs. Secondly, we go further than simply equating job equality to degree 
of formality by employing three comprehensive measures of job quality that 
combine measures of earnings, nature of the work place, adequacy of work-
ing hours, commuting time to work, and job stability, as well as a host of 
institutional variables that capture non-wage and fringe benefits of a job. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our 
conceptual framework and a brief review of the related literature. Section 3 
details the empirical methodology for linking trade liberalization measures 
to wage and quality outcomes. Section 4 describes the data sources and trade 
1 For a comprehensive review of recent empirical findings on trade and wage inequality in develo -
ing countries, see Goldberg and Pavcnik (2004) and on trade and employment see Hoekman and 
Winters (2005).
5policy reform in Egypt as well as the issues related to job quality indices used 
in the study. Section 5 presents the results of first and second stage regres-
sion that relate trade policy and openness measures to inter-industry wage 
and job quality premiums. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Conceptual Framework and Related Literature
Previous literature on the effects of trade reform on labor markets has 
concentrated on wage and price effects, with only a small number of stud-
ies explicitly handling the effect on job quality and informality. Goldberg 
and Pavcnik (2003) presented a theoretical model that examined the rela-
tionship between trade liberalization and informal employment. Their 
model implies that trade liberalization will lower the optimal number 
of formal workers hired by a firm and increase that of informal workers. 
They test this model using data for Brazil and Columbia during periods 
of widespread liberalization. They found that trade liberalization did not 
contribute to the expansion of the informal sector in Brazil. Trade lib-
eralization was, however, associated with a small but significant rise in 
informality in Columbia, although only in the period prior to labor mar-
ket reforms that made it less costly for firms to fire formal employees. 
Marjit, Kar, and Beladi (2007) present a theoretical model that incorpo-
rates both formal and informal workers in a Hecksher-Ohlin-Samuelson 
(HOS) framework. They find that a reduction in tariffs in the import-
competing sector will raise both employment and wages in the informal 
sector. Informal wages will also rise in the export sector whose price has 
increased, but informal employment in that sector will fall even if the sec-
tor is labor-intensive. They do not test these results empirically. The only 
other paper that we are aware of that discusses the quality of jobs following 
trade reform empirically is Currie and Harrison (1997) who find that trade 
liberalization in Morocco is associated with an increase in the number of 
temporary workers hired by firms in the formal sector.
The relationship between trade and wages follows theoretically from 
the HOS framework. According to HOS, trade will affect the relative pay-
ments to factors of production by changing relative prices of commodities. 
A reduction in tariffs, for example, would lower a commodity’s relative 
price, which would lower the demand for factors of production used in 
that sector. If the sector happens to be labor-abundant, then the decline in 
prices will disproportionately lower the demand for labor and hence lower 
6their wages. Hence, trade liberalization would lead to increasing inequality 
between factors of production. However, this model does not predict that 
trade will alter industry-specific returns since it assumes perfectly compet-
itive markets with perfect factor mobility across uses. These assumptions 
do not seem to be valid for many developing countries where markets are 
characterized by wide-spread imperfections and factors of production 
are extremely immobile. The short-run Immobile Factors Model or the 
medium-run Ricardo-Viner Model that assume constrained factor mobil-
ity across sectors are arguably more suited to the situation in developing 
countries with extreme labor and product market rigidities such as Egypt.
The Immobile Factors Model assumes that all factors are completely 
immobile in the short run. It predicts that tariff reductions and increased 
trade will lead to a decline in the earnings of factors in the import-com-
peting sectors and an increase in earnings in the export sector. Similarly, 
workers in sectors that experience a larger decline in tariffs, and hence a 
larger decline in the price of their output, will face a decline in their wages 
relative to the economy-wide average, while those in sectors with smaller 
tariff reduction will face a relative welfare gain. The Ricardo-Viner Model 
(sometimes referred to as the Specific Factors Model) is a middle-ground 
that allows one factor to be mobile across sectors while the other one is 
sector-specific. In this case, the factor specific to the import competing 
industry will lose from lower tariffs, that specific to the export-competing 
industry will gain from freer trade, while the effect on the real wages of 
labor (the mobile factor) will be ambiguous depending on the consum-
er’s preferences for the two goods. The real wage will rise in terms of the 
imported good, which is now cheaper, but will fall in terms of the export-
able good, which is now more expensive.
Several studies have attempted to test the relationship between trade 
reform, employment, and relative wages for both developing and advanced 
economies. For the United States, Revenga (1992), Katz and Freeman 
(1992), and Gaston and Trefler (1994) were some of first attempts to mea-
sure the effect of the expansion of trade in the 1980s on industry wages. 
These studies point to a negative relation between tariff protection and 
industry wages or wage premia. 
For developing countries, Hanson and Harrison (1999) used firm panel 
data to investigate whether the rising skilled/unskilled wage gap in Mexico 
in the 1980s could be explained by trade reforms. They did not find a sig-
nificant correlation between producer price changes and relative white 
collar employment. However, they found that reductions in tariffs were 
7much lower in skill intensive sectors, which were originally less protected 
than the low-skill sectors. This in turn meant that reductions in prices in 
the low-skilled sectors were larger, which would explain the increase in 
wage differentials. In another paper, Harrison and Hanson (1999) found no 
significant relation between the ratio of white-collar to blue-collar work-
ers’ average annual wages and the level and change of industry tariffs and 
import licenses in the manufacturing sector between 1984 and 1990 in 
Mexico. Revenga (1997), using the same firm panel data for Mexico found 
that tariff reductions were associated with a decline in both employment 
and wages. Currie and Harrison (1997) investigated the impact of trade 
reform on wages and employment in Morocco during the 1980s. They 
found no significant effect of tariff reduction on employment or wages in 
private sector firms. Government-owned enterprises, on the other hand, 
responded to tariff reductions by raising employment and lowering wages. 
All of these studies relied on data that did not include information on 
worker characteristics. This does not allow for separating the effect of 
the reduction in trade barriers on wages from that on returns to educa-
tion. Feliciano (2001) is one of the first studies that used individual-level 
data to study the impact of trade reform on wages. She follows a two-step 
procedure, first estimating the wage equation for each individual-industry 
observation, as a function of individual characteristics such as years of 
schooling, experience, marital status, gender, enterprise (public/private), 
and industry. Next, she estimated the relationship between this calcu-
lated industry wage differential and measures of industry protection levels 
(tariffs and license coverage, as well as trade openness, producer prices, 
and import penetration). Her results indicate that reductions in tariffs, 
changes in producer prices, and import penetration did not have a signifi-
cant effect on industry wage differentials. She found that the reduction 
in import licenses decreased relative wages of workers in reformed manu-
facturing industries by 2%. Her results also indicate no significant effect 
of trade reform on employment or hours of work. Her evidence also sug-
gests that trade reform was associated with greater wage dispersion and a 
decrease in the relative wages of skilled workers.
Attanasio, Goldberg, and Pavcnik (2004) investigated the effects of 
tariff reductions in Columbia in the 1980s and 90s on wage inequality. 
They also use two-stage estimation techniques similar to that of Feliciano, 
to calculate the effect of tariff reductions on industry wage premiums. 
Their results indicate a positive and significant effect of both tariff levels 
and first differences in tariffs on industry wage premiums. These results 
8also point to an economically significant effect with a 50% reduction in 
tariffs being associated with 6% decrease in the industry wage premium 
in that sector. They also find that the sectors that experienced the high-
est reduction in tariff protection and hence in industry wage premiums 
were also the same sectors with the highest share of unskilled workers and 
the lowest wages. Another interesting finding of Attanasio et al. (2004) is 
related to the increased rate of informal employment in Columbia follow-
ing trade reforms. This issue ties directly to the job quality issue although 
the only aspect of job quality that they consider is the informality issue 
(thereby ignoring the low quality of temporary jobs in the formal sector, 
for example). They found that reductions in tariffs are associated with 
an increase in informal employment, although this effect was more pro-
nounced before Columbia implemented labor market reforms that made 
it less costly to fire workers.
Dutta (2007) performed a similar analysis for wages in India’s manufac-
turing sector following large scale trade reforms in the 1980s and 90s. She 
calculated industry wage premiums after accounting for observable worker 
characteristics and potential selection bias as the difference between the 
wage received by the average worker in a given industry and that received 
by the average worker in the economy. She then uses these wage premiums 
to determine the effect of trade reform. She finds a positive and significant 
effect of tariffs on wage premia, and of changes in tariffs on changes in 
wage premia. This provides evidence that wages declined significantly fol-
lowing the reduction in protection levels in the affected industries.  Acosta 
and Gasparini (2007) investigate the effects of capital accumulation and 
trade liberalization on rising wage inequality in Argentina during the 
1990s. They find that the capital accumulation effect on rising inequality 
was larger than the trade liberalization effect as measured by import pen-
etration. However, they do not use a direct measure of trade liberalization 
as embodied in tariff rates. Import penetration rates and other trade flow 
measures are arguably endogenous since they depend on factor costs, and 
hence most studies cited above rely on tariffs and changes in tariffs as the 
main measure of trade policy changes while import and export measures 
are used in robustness check regressions with tariffs.
Other studies have relied on comparing the degree of wage inequality 
and employment effects on various groups of workers using a “before-af-
ter” approach, not controlling specifically for the effect of trade reform 
(Robertson [1997]; Green, Dickerson, and Arbache [2001]; and El-Hamidi 
[2008] to name a few). The obvious drawback with these studies is that 
9many other policy changes typically accompany trade reform such as pub-
lic sector downsizing, privatization, structural adjustment, etc., and unless 
direct measures of trade reform are included in the analysis, clear cut con-
clusions about the effects of trade reform per se, cannot be made with any 
degree of confidence. Hence, the main contribution of this paper is to use a 
methodology that directly accounts for worker characteristics by using indi-
vidual-level data, and to use direct trade liberalization policy measures as 
embodied in tariffs. We also investigate the effect of liberalization on both 
wages and job quality, which will provide useful insights into how these two 
variables may respond differently to different policy measures.
3. Empirical Methodology
Our focus is on the impact of trade liberalization on industry wages and 
job quality. We employ the inter-industry wage differentials approach to 
determine whether workers in less heavily protected industries have lower 
wages or job quality than workers of similar observable characteristics in 
the more heavily protected industries. Even after accounting for worker-
specific characteristics such as education and experience, workers in the 
same occupations in different industries may still earn different wages. We 
can utilize these industry wage premia, as they are called, to investigate 
the effect of reduced protection or increased trade on wages and job qual-
ity. We expect these changes to affect worker wages or job quality within a 
given industry first, because in the short run, workers are immobile—they 
cannot move between industries—and thus any such industry-specific 
change will affect working conditions in that industry first, before affecting 
other economy-wide variables. The effects of liberalization can therefore 
be identified at the industry level.
Let i=1, 2, 3…I
j
 index workers in industry j. We regress the log of worker 
i’s wages at time t (ln(wijt)) and the index of their job quality (JQIijt) on a 
vector of worker characteristics Hijt (age, age squared, gender, education 
indicators, sector indicators, and region of residence) and a set of vari-
ables (Pjt) reflecting the degree of protection and international trade at the 
industry level. We estimate the following equations:
    (1)
     (2)
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for  and t = 1998 or 2006.
The one-step estimator is consistent, but if there are errors shared by 
all individuals within a given industry, the standard errors will be biased 
downward. Following Dickens and Katz (1987), a two-step procedure 
is implemented. In the first stage we regress the log of worker wages (or 
job quality index) on the vector of worker characteristics Hijt, and a set of 
industry indicators Iijt reflecting worker i’s industry affiliation:
     (3)
The coefficient on the industry dummies wpjt are then regressed in 
the second stage on industry characteristics including measures of trade 
and protection. These wage premiums are estimated for J industries, with 
J-1 dummy variables. The estimated wage premiums are sensitive to the 
choice of omitted industry dummy. To avoid this problem, Krueger and 
Summers (1988) suggest a normalization that expresses these industry wage 
premiums as deviations from the omitted industry premium. Haisken-
DeNew and Schmidt (1997) suggest an improvement that renders these 
differentials completely independent of the omitted industry dummy, by 
calculating the industry wage premiums as deviations from an employ-
ment weighted mean:
      (4)
where wp*jt is a column vector of the normalized wage differentials, I 
is an identity matrix and W is a matrix of industry employment weights 
with each element , where nj is the number of  workers in 
industry j. This normalized wage premium can be interpreted as the pro-
portional difference in wages (job quality) for a worker in that industry, 
relative to an average worker with the same characteristics in the economy 
as a whole. The adjusted variance-covariance matrix V(wp*jt) is computed 
as suggested by Haisken-DeNew and Schmidt (1997): 
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    (5)
The normalized industry wage premia are then pooled over time (the 
first-stage regressions were performed separately for each year) and the 
effect of liberalization is estimated by the following equation:
     (6)
We are primarily interested in the effect of trade policy changes on 
wages and job quality, the coefficient βp, where trade policy is measured by 
tariff levels and changes in tariffs. We also include measures of the degree 
of export orientation (exports/output) and import penetration (imports/
(output +imports-exports)) as controls, and to facilitate the comparison of 
our results with other studies. Export orientation and import penetration 
measures are arguably endogenous since they depend on factor costs, and 
hence we rely on tariffs and changes in tariffs as the main measure of trade 
policy changes. 
The vector Djt consists of a set of industry controls, as well as a dummy 
variable for year. If political economy factors are important, such that those 
industries with the least skilled, or lowest-wage workers are the ones that 
get the highest rates of protection, then tariffs may in fact not be exoge-
nous (Goldberg and Pavcnick 2005). It is thus important to include industry 
indicators that control for non-observable industry characteristics. We also 
include controls for a number of industry characteristics available in the 
data. The percentage of female workers may have an impact on the over-
all wage level in that industry. This is true to the extent that females are 
“crowded out” into lower paying or worse quality jobs, and hence we expect 
the larger the number of females in an industry, the lower the wages or job 
quality for the industry as a whole (Dutta 2007). The degree of unioniza-
tion has also often been found to have a positive impact on wages. Dickens 
(1986) argues that firms may be willing to pay higher wages if there is a viable 
threat of collective action. Hence we expect wages to be higher in indus-
tries where it is easier to form unions (for example, where large plants are 
prevalent) and thus to have an independent effect on wages of all workers in 
that industry. The average level of skill in the industry as proxied by educa-
tion may also have an impact on the industry wage premium, independent 
of that on the individual wage (Dickens and Katz 1987). The percentage of 
skilled workers (those with secondary or higher education) and the percent 
12
of blue-collar workers capture this effect. We include industry indicators 
that capture other industry characteristics for which we do not have data.2
Another way to account for this potential simultaneity bias, is to esti-
mate equation (6) in first differences. This is also useful since the relevant 
policy questions are usually framed in the form of how changes in tariff lev-
els affect changes in wages or job quality. To this end we also estimate:
   (7)
where ∆ wp*jt is the change in industry wage premium for industry j 
between 2006 and 1998, ∆ tjt is the change in tariffs in industry j between 
2006 and 1998, ∆ T’jt denotes changes in other trade related variables 
such as export orientation and import penetration, while
 
 ∆ D’jt denotes 
time-variant changes in industry characteristics, such as feminization(the 
change in percent female), unionization and skill level (we do not include a 
year indicator since there is only one t to t-1 period in this data). 
Regressions are estimated by Weighted Least Squares (WLS). The 
dependent variable in the second stage regressions (equation (6)) was esti-
mated from the wage equations in the first stage (equation (3)), and could 
thus suffer from estimation errors. As long as this measurement error is 
independent of the other regressors, it does not affect the consistency of 
the estimates of equation (6), but does introduce some noise in the results. 
Specifically, the coefficients in the wage-trade regression models might 
have large variances that could possibly differ across industries depending 
on the variance of the estimated industry coefficients. We thus estimate 
equation (6) with WLS, using the inverse of the standard deviations of the 
estimated wage premiums obtained from the wage equations that were 
calculated according to the Haisken-DeNew and Schmidt (1997) method. 
This assigns lower weight to industries with larger variance in industry 
premiums. Finally, to account for general forms of heteroskedasticity and 
serial correlation in the error term—in particular intergroup correlation 
for workers within the same industry—we compute robust (Huber-White) 
standard errors clustered by industry.
2 Measures such as the capital output ratio, industry concentration or industry capital accumulation 
would also have been useful, however we do not have data on them.
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4. Trade, Labor Market and Job Quality Data 
4.1 Trade Reform in Egypt. 
Although Egypt has taken a gradual approach to trade liberalization, 
the once highly restrictive trade regime has been reversed with the initi-
ation of reforms in 1986 to the beginning of WTO agreements in 1994/5 
and the signing of several multi and unilateral trade agreements in the 
mid-1990s, for example, COMESA, TIFA, and PAFTA. The Egyptian 
maximum tariff fell from 100% to 70%. It then continued to fall, reach-
ing 40% in 1998. The next two years saw a slight increase to 43% with 
the most highly protected industries including textiles, clothing, leather 
products, cars, transportation, furniture, glass and pottery and bever-
ages, while cotton ginning has consistently been negatively protected 
(Refaat, 2003).
Pledged to be in full compliance with WTO commitments, Egypt has 
had a policy of removing non-tariff barriers and replacing them with tar-
iffs. In 1998, Egypt reduced the maximum tariff rate for most imports 
from a high of 50% to 40%. Refaat (2003) calculates the unweighted 
average tariff rates and the import-weighted average. Both display a sig-
nificant fall between 1994 and 1998 when the unweighted average fell 
from 25.9% to 19.9%. After a slight rise up to 21.5% in 2000 it declined 
back to 20.4% in 2002 showing that trade reform slowed after 2000. 
Import-weighted averages follow the same trend, but at a lower level, 
indicating that imports are skewed toward the low-tariff goods. In addi-
tion to tariffs, Egyptian customs charges a fee for service and inspection 
of 1% on all imports plus an additional fee of 2% on goods that are sub-
ject to tariffs between 5% and 29% or 3% on goods that are subject to 
tariffs of 30% or more. During the 1990s Egypt passed legislation pro-
tecting its industries. These include only allowing cars to be imported in 
their year of manufacture, increasing the local component requirement 
for car assembly to 45% from 40%, and encouraging government bodies 
to buy domestic products.  
Despite concerted efforts to liberalize a highly restrictive trade regime 
since the early 1990s, Egypt’s tariffs remain relatively high, especially when 
compared to other developing countries with large internal markets and 
diversified industrial economies. Most manufacturing sectors continue 
to be highly protected mainly via a high and escalating tariff structure. 
14
Between 1998 and 2005 the simple average tariff rate for manufacturing 
fell from 27.6% to 21.1%, while that for agricultural products increased 
from 64.9% to 66.4%. Following WTO accession in 1995, Egypt’s com-
mitments have been more or less to bind tariff rates at levels that in many 
cases have exceeded existing levels. While 98% of Egypt’s tariff lines are 
bound, the average bound rate fell from 45% in 1998 to 38.6% in 2005. The 
average bound rate on agricultural products stands at 92.2% in contrast to 
29% for non-agricultural products (WTO 2005).
To further open the Egyptian economy, the new cabinet of 2004 
reduced average unweighted tariff rate from 27% to 20% and rationalized 
the tariff structure. The number of products subject to non-tariff barri-
ers was also substantially reduced. After the 2004 reform it is evident that 
both nominal and effective protection has declined for almost all manu-
facturing sectors with most of trade liberalization efforts concentrated in 
the area of intermediate and capital goods. 
Table 1 : Measures of Trade Reform in Egypt 1997-2005
15
Table 1 shows data on tariff reductions over the period 1997–2005. The 
average tariff declined was from 18.6% to 12.3% over this period. The big-
gest declines were in motorized vehicle manufacturing, rubber products 
and paper manufacturing. On average the import penetration index did 
not change substantially or declined for other industries over this period; 
however, it has increased for coke and petroleum products, leather goods, 
motorized vehicles, and furniture manufacturing.
The most notable is the increase in export promotion index from an 
average of 10.2 to 14.4 for coke and petroleum, non-metallic minerals, and 
metallic products. Moreover, export promotion also increased in food 
and beverage and furniture manufacturing, followed by office equipment 
and chemical products.
4.2 Labor Market Data
The empirical analysis is based on the recent Egypt Labor Market Panel 
Survey (ELMPS
06), a follow-up survey to the Egypt Labor Market Survey of 1998 
(ELMS 98) that was carried out by the Economic Research Forum (ERF) 
in cooperation with CAPMAS.3 ELMS 1998 was carried out on a nation-
ally representative sample of 4,816 households. The ELMPS 2006 sample 
consists of a total of 8,349 households. The data provide information on 
monthly earnings, worker characteristics such as age, education, gender, 
marital status, occupation, industry, and sector of employment, as well as 
region of residence. The working sample is restricted to manufacturing 
sector workers, between the ages of 15 and 65, who report positive monthly 
earnings. Hourly real wages are calculated as the sum of wages earned in 
the reference month from primary jobs, adjusted for average number of 
work days per month and average hours per day. For comparability pur-
poses, wages of 1998 are inflated to 2006 Egyptian pounds using the 
consumer price index (inflation factor is 1.43 from 1998 to 2006). The same 
data set can be utilized in constructing several comprehensive measures of 
job quality as detailed in the next sub section. 
3 For more details, see Barsoum, G., 2006. Egypt Labor Market Panel Survey 2006, Final Report. The 
Population Council, Cairo, Egypt.
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4.3 Job Quality Indices
As job quality is a multifaceted concept, a wide range of indicators have 
been proposed by several studies. In this study we derive a measure of job 
quality based on indicators from ELMPS. Basing on review of literature,4 
job quality can be measured along four dimensions: 1) Income security, 
which entails adequate income, access to social security and health care; 
2) Employment security, which defines regularity of employment, contract, 
paid sick leave, and paid annual leave; 3) Voice representation, security 
measures, membership in trade unions; and 4) Work security, adequate 
working hours, decent workplace, and reasonable commuting distance 
to work. Operationalizing the above measurement dimensions to the 
labor data we have on hand an index of job quality is constructed that in 
cooperates the following 11 criteria: 1) earnings, 2) nature of workplace, 3) 
adequate working hours, 4) commuting time to work, 5) has regular job, 6) 
has social insurance, 7) has health insurance, 8) has a contract, 9) has paid 
sick leave, 10) has paid annual leave, and 11) member of a trade union. As 
some of these measures are continuous (e.g. earnings, working hours, com-
muting time to work) as others are dichotomous, we normalize continuous 
variables to a scale of 0 to 1 then combine the different measures into a 
single measure using factor analysis. We let correlation structure among 
variables produce the factor weights.
Based on the above criteria, three measures of job quality will be used, 
the institutional job quality measure that only incorporates criteria from 
6 to 11, the JQIWW which entails all criteria but is limited to only wage 
workers and finally the JQWW2 which is also confined to only wage work-
ers and includes all but the earnings criteria thus a non earnings job quality 
measurement. The advantage of the use of the above job quality measures 
as dependent variables in the empirical analysis lies in the comprehensive-
ness of the indices in comparison to previous studies that use a dummy for 
formality. Our job indices are therefore much more informative about the 
true quality of work as implied by the decent work literature which goes 
far beyond formality.
4 For a detailed literature review and the methodology underlying the job quality indices used here 
see Assad and Roushdy (2008).
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5. Results
5.1 Descriptive Statistics and First Stage Regressions
Table 2 presents summary descriptive statistics of variables used in first 
and second stage regression. As noted in the introduction, the sample of 
estimation is limited to wage workers currently employed in the manufac-
turing sector. All figures are properly weighted to reflect the population 
distribution. A comparison of 1998 and 2006 figures reveals that on aver-
age, real hourly wages increased, whereas all three measures of job quality 
recorded a marked decline over this period. 
Table 2 : Means and Standard Deviation of Variables Used in Regressions
 1998 2006
VARIABLE No. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. No. Obs. Mean Std. Dev.
       
LnRHrWag 836 0.25 0.66 1189 0.73 0.78
JQIAllWrkr 1021 0.37 0.77 1533 0.30 0.73
InstFacAll~s 1027 0.08 0.90 1533 -0.05 0.86
JQIWWcom 837 0.28 0.70 1195 0.19 0.64
JQIexwWWcom 842 0.27 0.68 1195 0.21 0.61
pub_gov 1027 0.29 0.45 1533 0.19 0.39
Priv 1027 0.71 0.45 1533 0.81 0.39
Expr 1027 18.14 13.02 1533 16.81 12.16
Exprsq 1027 498.40 585.24 1533 430.22 542.66
Illiterate 1027 0.20 0.40 1533 0.18 0.38
Read/Write 1027 0.15 0.35 1533 0.08 0.28
Primary 1027 0.17 0.37 1533 0.14 0.35
Preparatory 1027 0.08 0.27 1533 0.07 0.26
GeneralSec~y 1027 0.01 0.12 1533 0.01 0.10
Vocational~c 1027 0.27 0.44 1533 0.35 0.48
PostSecond~y 1027 0.05 0.21 1533 0.05 0.21
univabove 1027 0.08 0.27 1533 0.12 0.32
Greater Cairo 1027 0.28 0.45 1533 0.26 0.44
Alex 1027 0.12 0.32 1533 0.13 0.33
Rur. Up. Egypt 1027 0.15 0.36 1533 0.16 0.36
Urb. Up. Egypt 1027 0.05 0.22 1533 0.05 0.22
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Rur. L. Egypt 1027 0.27 0.44 1533 0.28 0.45
Urb. L. Egypt 1027 0.14 0.34 1533 0.13 0.33
Tariff 21 0.19 0.10 21 0.13 0.09
imp_penet2 21 0.40 0.26 21 0.39 0.25
export_ori~t 21 0.10 0.12 21 0.15 0.14
chng_tariff -- -- -- 21 -0.06 0.05
chng_imp_p~2 -- -- -- 21 0.00 0.12
chng_expor~t -- -- -- 21 0.04 0.12
% Female 21 0.11 0.14 21 0.14 0.14
unionized 21 0.25 0.16 21 0.27 0.18
skilled_sec 21 0.51 0.23 21 0.63 0.22
blue_collar 21 0.59 0.20 21 0.56 0.27
chng_female -- -- -- 21 0.03 0.14
chng_union~d -- -- -- 21 0.01 0.13
chng_sk~_sec -- -- -- 21 0.12 0.11
chng_blue_~r -- -- -- 21 -0.03 0.12
   
Notes: Definition
% Female % of female workers by industry
unionized % of unionized workers by industry
skilled_sec % of workers with secondary or higher education by industry
blue_collar % of blue collar workers by industry (defined as crocpc1=6 to 9)
chng_female change between 2006 and 1998 in % of female workers by industry
chng_union~d change between 2006 and 1998 in% of unionized workers by industry
chng_sk~_sec
change between 2006 and 1998 in % of workers with secondary or higher 
education by industry
chng_blue_~r
change between 2006 and 1998 in % of blue collar workers by industry 
(defined as crocpc1=6 to 9)
As for the explanatory variables, the share of public enterprises in the 
manufacturing sector in Egypt has declined from 30% to 20%, and this 
shift coincided with a slight decline in average years of experience (from 18 
to 16.8), a more notable increase in the share of workers with a university 
degree (from 8% to 12%), and a substantial increase in the proportion of 
workers with a vocational secondary degree (from 26.5% to 35%). Figures in 
both years reflect a high concentration of manufacturing activity in greater 
Cairo and rural lower Egypt, together accounting for over 50% of employ-
ment in the sector. 
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As for trade related and other industry variables, the average figures indi-
cate a 6% decline in average tariffs, a 15% increase in export orientation and 
hardly any change in import penetration. Manufacturing industries also on 
average become more feminized, unionized and staffed by an increasing por-
tion of white collar and more skilled (secondary degrees and above) workers.
Table 3 presents the first stage  regression results for four model of 
dependent variables (LnRHrWag: log real hourly wages, InstFacAllWrkrs: 
institutional  factors job quality index, All factors job quality index and All 
factors excluding earnings, yet all employing same regressors reflecting the 
key human capital model (experience, experience squared, levels of educa-
tional attainment, and sex and regional dummies).
Table 3a. First Stage Wage and Job Quality Regressions: 1998
1998 (1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES LnRHrWag InstFacAllWrkrs JQIWWcom JQIexwWWcom
Female -0.011 -0.083 -0.213*** -0.209***
(0.067) (0.058) (0.067) (0.067)
pub_gov -0.018 0.996*** 0.448*** 0.469***
(0.049) (0.046) (0.049) (0.049)
Expr 0.054*** 0.030*** 0.009 -0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Exprsq -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Read/Write 0.181*** 0.269*** 0.193*** 0.187***
(0.066) (0.059) (0.067) (0.066)
Primary 0.351*** 0.185*** 0.217*** 0.182***
(0.064) (0.058) (0.065) (0.064)
Preparatory 0.354*** 0.247*** 0.348*** 0.306***
(0.081) (0.074) (0.081) (0.080)
GeneralSecondary 0.640*** 0.361** 0.305* 0.235
(0.176) (0.150) (0.176) (0.175)
VocationalSec 0.497*** 0.457*** 0.324*** 0.256***
(0.063) (0.058) (0.063) (0.062)
PostSecondary 0.533*** 0.441*** 0.409*** 0.314***
(0.095) (0.093) (0.096) (0.095)
univabove 1.076*** 0.649*** 0.524*** 0.335***
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(0.086) (0.080) (0.086) (0.086)
Alex 0.003 0.041 -0.102 -0.100
(0.063) (0.061) (0.063) (0.063)
Rur. Up. Egypt -0.055 -0.230*** -0.285*** -0.273***
(0.064) (0.059) (0.064) (0.063)
Urb. Up. Egypt -0.031 -0.186** -0.268*** -0.250***
(0.094) (0.082) (0.094) (0.093)
Rur. L. Egypt -0.140*** -0.182*** -0.214*** -0.198***
(0.054) (0.049) (0.054) (0.054)
Urb. L. Egypt -0.062 -0.118** -0.184*** -0.187***
(0.064) (0.057) (0.064) (0.064)
Constant -0.776*** -0.667*** -0.131 0.041
(0.090) (0.085) (0.090) (0.089)
Observations 836 1027 837 842
R-squared 0.430 0.667 0.490 0.451
Standard errors in 
parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3b. First Stage Wage and Job Quality Regressions: 2006
2006 (1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES LnRHrWag InstFacAllWrkrs JQIWWcom JQIexwWWcom
female -0.166** -0.169*** -0.212*** -0.176***
(0.066) (0.050) (0.052) (0.051)
pub_gov 0.130** 0.857*** 0.330*** 0.340***
(0.056) (0.048) (0.044) (0.043)
expr 0.043*** 0.027*** 0.031*** 0.025***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
exprsq -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Read/Write -0.037 0.059 0.095 0.095
(0.090) (0.066) (0.071) (0.070)
Primary 0.087 0.173*** 0.197*** 0.192***
(0.074) (0.057) (0.058) (0.057)
Preparatory 0.157* 0.157** 0.134* 0.106
(0.090) (0.071) (0.071) (0.070)
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GeneralSecondary 0.124 0.234 0.171 0.141
(0.201) (0.162) (0.154) (0.151)
VocationalSec 0.246*** 0.393*** 0.314*** 0.278***
(0.065) (0.051) (0.051) (0.050)
PostSecondary 0.355*** 0.332*** 0.359*** 0.294***
(0.102) (0.086) (0.080) (0.079)
univabove 0.738*** 0.616*** 0.509*** 0.398***
(0.082) (0.066) (0.064) (0.063)
Alex -0.055 0.200*** 0.049 0.049
(0.065) (0.055) (0.051) (0.050)
Rur. Up. Egypt -0.130* -0.257*** -0.292*** -0.283***
(0.068) (0.053) (0.053) (0.052)
Urb. Up. Egypt -0.255** -0.144* -0.322*** -0.293***
(0.105) (0.078) (0.082) (0.081)
Rur. L. Egypt -0.211*** -0.149*** -0.107** -0.073*
(0.055) (0.045) (0.043) (0.042)
Urb. L. Egypt -0.093 -0.129** -0.161*** -0.142***
(0.067) (0.054) (0.053) (0.052)
Constant 0.107 -0.645*** -0.516*** -0.410***
(0.099) (0.079) (0.078) (0.077)
Observations 1189 1533 1195 1195
R-squared 0.301 0.520 0.365 0.324
Standard errors in 
parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1
Based on goodness of fit statistics, the human capital model appears to 
well explain both wage setting and job quality outcomes in the manufac-
turing sector in Egypt. It is interesting to note that this is particularly the 
case with the institutional factors job quality index, where as much as 67% 
of the variations in this variable in 1998 and 52% of the variations in 2006 
in this variable are jointly explained by the regressors. As expected, there 
is a significant negative wage and job quality differential associated with 
being female in both years, and that differential is largest for the all factors 
job quality index. Compared to 1998, the female disadvantage in wages 
worsened and became more significant in 2006, but it actually declined in 
terms of job quality. There is a large and significant positive premium par-
ticularly for institutional factors job quality associated with public sector 
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employment in Egypt. This premium has, however, declined but not disap-
peared in 2006. The experience wage and experience job quality profiles 
follow the expected inverted U-shape implied by human capital theory. 
There are also increasing returns to education, and they particularly jump 
at the university or above levels. Finally, there are mostly negative and sig-
nificant differentials due to residence outside of greater Cairo. The only 
exception is the significant positive premium in terms of institutional fac-
tors job quality due to residence in Alexandria. 
5.2 Inter-Industry Wage and Job Quality Premiums 
The industry coefficients estimated in the wage and job quality first-
stage regressions, normalized as deviations from their employment 
weighted mean as described in Section 3 are in Tables A1 and A2. The 
inter-industry wage premiums are large and range from 25% in 1998 for 
the coke and petroleum products industry to -31% for the paper industry. 
The range was much wider in 2006, reflecting the increased overall wage 
inequality, with the highest premium again earned in the coke and petro-
leum products industry at +60%, and the lowest premium (-20%) in the 
leather goods industry. 
In terms of job quality premiums, the ranges were in fact narrower in 
2006, reflecting decreased inequality in these aspects of job quality. In 
terms of institutional factors, medical equipment manufacturing had the 
highest premiums (+62%) in 1998, while furniture manufacturing had the 
lowest. In 2006, the tobacco industry had the highest premiums (51%), 
while the other transport equipment manufacturing had the lowest (-30%). 
The ranges and ranking by the other two job quality premiums are very 
close together, although they differ somewhat from that by institutional 
factors. In 1998, the highest JQWW and JQWW2 Premiums were in 
equipment manufacturing and paper manufacturing respectively, while the 
lowest was in wood product manufacturing. In 2006, the highest premia 
by both measures was again in the tobacco industry, while the lowest was 
still in wood product manufacturing.
Figures 1 and 2 plot the normalized wage and job quality premiums 
by industry for 1998 and 2006, respectively. Clearly, high wage premiums 
are often associated with low job quality and vice versa. This is true for 
all three measures of job quality. In fact the premiums based on JQWW 
and JQWW2 are remarkably similar, which indicates that wages (included 
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in the JQWW index but not the JQWW2) seem to go hand in hand with 
other aspects of the “quality” of a given job. Finally, it is also interesting to 
look at Spearman Rank Correlation for these indices. These are reported 
in Tables A3 and A4. As expected, there is relatively low correlation in 
terms of rank between wage premiums and all three job quality indices, 
especially for 1998. All three job quality indices are of course highly corre-
lated in terms of rank, although JQWW and JQWW2 are almost perfectly 
correlated, again pointing to the fact that high paying jobs are also those 
with the best “quality”.
5.3 Second Stage Regression Results
5.3.1 The Effect on Wages
In this section we report the main results of the study, that examine the 
impact of trade liberalization on wages and job quality, based on the esti-
mation of equations (6) and (7). We start by examining the effect on wages 
in Table 4. Column (1) shows the results of including only tariffs—our main 
variable of interest—in addition to the variables that capture industry spe-
cific characteristics. 
Table 4: Effect of trade policy on wage premiums
Dependent Variable: Wage Premium (WP) or Change in Wage Premium, Weighted Least 
Squares Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable WP WP WP WP
Change in 
WP
Change 
in WP
Tariff -1.290 -0.832 -0.493 -0.248 -1.115 -0.638
(1.217) (0.719) (0.497) (0.538) (0.729) (0.620)
Import penetration 0.082 -0.004 0.228 -0.054
(0.356) (0.098) (0.390) (0.287)
Export orientation 0.443* 0.348 1.017*** 0.528**
(0.253) (0.295) (0.252) (0.212)
% Female -0.405 -0.166 -0.412***
(0.280) (0.101) (0.138)
Unionization 0.231 0.144 0.246
(0.487) (0.212) (0.292)
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Skilled: % with 
secondary + 
education
0.092 -0.025 -0.028
(0.560) (0.202) (0.266)
Blue collar 0.219 -0.176 0.382
(0.448) (0.255) (0.253)
Change in export 
orientation
0.823**
(0.367)
Industry and time 
indicators
yes yes no no no no
WP regressed on 
changes 
no no no yes no no
First differences no no no no yes yes
Observations 40 40 21 21 21 21
R-squared 0.898 0.914 0.659 0.687 0.342 0.281
Robust standard errors adjusted for 21 industry clusters in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1
The effect of tariffs is negative but insignificant. Note that when the 
standard errors for these regressions were calculated without accounting 
for intergroup correlation for workers within the same industry by clus-
tering, they were much smaller, and the coefficient on tariff was the same 
magnitude, negative and significant. This clearly demonstrates the impor-
tance of clustering when calculating these standard errors.
In column (2) we include the other trade related variables (import pene-
tration and export orientation). The coefficient on tariff is still negative and 
insignificant. Interestingly, the coefficient on export orientation is positive 
and significant, implying that wages in industries that have a higher per-
centage of their output exported are higher compared to other industries. 
If we further include the change in export orientation in the regression for 
2006 in column (3), the coefficient on that is also large, positive, and signifi-
cant. This indicates that industries that saw the greatest increase in their 
exports between 1998 and 2006 also had the highest wages in 2006.
In column (4) we regress wage premiums in 2006 on the changes in all 
the dependent variables between 1998 and 2006. This again reinforces the 
earlier conclusion that industries with the largest increase in exports had 
the highest wages in 2006.
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These results are further reinforced when we use the first difference 
specification in columns (5) and (6). In column (5) we include only change 
in tariff, in addition to changes in the percent of female workers, unioniza-
tion, skill level, and percent of blue-collar workers. Again, the change in 
tariff does not have a significant effect on the change in wage premium. 
Industries that have witnessed an increased share of female workers over 
this period on the other hand, seem to have also seen a marked negative 
effect on their wages. Finally, in column (6), we also include the changes 
in the other trade variables, and once again, the more export-oriented an 
industry has become, the larger the increase in its wages over this period.5
The main conclusion from this section is that wages do not seem to 
have been significantly affected by changes in tariffs over this period. 
These results are similar to what Feliciano (2001) obtained for Mexico over 
a period of much more dramatic tariff reductions. One reason we may not 
be seeing large effects of tariffs for Egypt may be that this period did not 
witness very dramatic decreases in tariffs in many industries. The average 
tariff only declined from 18% to 12% over the period, while some industries 
even witnessed increases in tariff levels. On the other hand, industries that 
have witnessed greater export orientation have been able to pass on part 
of these profits in the form of higher wages to their workers. 
5.3.2 The Effect on Job Quality
We now turn to investigating the relationship between trade liberaliza-
tion and job quality as measured in a number of different ways. We start 
with job quality measured in terms of institutional factors only. Recall 
that this index incorporates only the following aspects of job quality: 
social security, medical insurance, a contract, paid casual leave, paid sick 
leave, and whether the worker is a member of a trade union. The results 
of estimating equations (6) and (7) on the Institutional Factors Job Quality 
Premium are reported in Table 5. In column (1) we report the results of 
regressing the Institutional Factors Premium on tariffs in addition to the 
variables that capture industry specific characteristics. The effect of tariffs 
is insignificantly different from zero. In column (2), we add the measures 
5 When the other time-variant industry controls were included in the regressions in columns (2), 
(3), and (6) they were all insignificant, and since we have only a limited number of degrees of freedom 
due to the small sample size, many of the other coefficients were also less precisely estimated. We 
therefore concentrate on the results reported here to save on space.
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of industry import penetration and export orientation, and the coeffi-
cient on export orientation is interestingly large, negative, and significant. 
This is in contrast to the positive effect that increased export orientation 
seemed to have had on wages in Table 4. The two results together indicate 
that although jobs in industries that are more oriented toward exporting 
may be higher paying jobs, these jobs typically do not include important 
aspects of institutional job quality such as social security, medical insur-
ance, and paid leaves.
Table 5: Effect of Trade Policy on the Institutional Factors Job Quality Premiums
Dependent Variable: Institutional Premium (IP) or Change in Institutional Premium, 
Weighted Least Squares Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent 
Variable
IP IP IP IP
Change 
in IP
Change 
in IP
Tariff 0.512 -0.107 -0.680 -1.388 -0.177 -0.604
(1.144) (0.948) (0.738) (1.111) (0.934) (0.750)
Import 
penetration
0.649 -0.358 -0.689* 0.927**
(0.500) (0.213) (0.347) (0.400)
Export 
orientation
-0.764* -0.672 -0.068 -0.874***
(0.407) (0.568) (0.455) (0.268)
% Female -0.735 -0.855 -0.287 -0.673* -0.739*
(0.475) (0.620) (0.212) (0.348) (0.385)
Unionization -0.022 0.168 0.437 0.212 0.217
(0.611) (0.496) (0.462) (0.427) (0.402)
Skilled: % with 
secondary + 
education
0.273 -0.036 0.385 -0.029 -0.397
(0.503) (0.597) (0.384) (0.368) (0.441)
Blue collar -0.252 -0.299 -0.771* -0.092 -0.103
(0.609) (0.511) (0.416) (0.478) (0.392)
Change in export 
orientation
0.150
(0.645)
Industry and 
time indicators
yes yes no no no no
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IP regressed on 
changes 
no no no yes no no
First differences no no no no yes yes
Observations 40 40 21 21 21 21
R-squared 0.914 0.943 0.305 0.488 0.281 0.488
In column (3) we keep the three primary trade variables, and add the 
change in export orientation to the estimation for 2006. The latter does 
not have a significant effect on the Institutional Factors Premium (it had 
a strong positive effect on the wage premium). Additionally, the effect of 
export orientation, though still negative, is now insignificant. Hence, even 
though the more export oriented an industry is, the lower its institutional 
aspects of job quality, we cannot say the same about the change in this 
export orientation between 1998 and 2006. 
In column (4), we further investigate this issue by regressing the 
Institutional Factors Premium levels on the changes in all variables between 
1998 and 2006. Industries with the highest changes in the degree of import 
penetration over the period had the lowest levels of Institutional Factors 
Premiums in 2006. The same applies to those industries with the larg-
est increase in the number of blue collar workers. The coefficient on the 
changes in tariffs and export orientation are insignificant, however.
In columns (5) and (6) we examine how changes in the Institutional Factors 
Premium were affected by changes in the trade and other industry specific 
variables. Once again the coefficient on the change in tariffs is negative 
and insignificant. Interestingly, we again see that industries with the largest 
increase in the percentage of female workers also went through the largest 
worsening of the institutional aspects of their job quality. This result echoes 
what we saw with the changes in wage premiums estimations. Finally, in 
column (6) we include the other trade variables. The coefficient on changes 
in import penetration is large, positive, and significant, while that on the 
change in export orientation is large, negative and significant. These results 
indicate that even if the Institutional Factors Premium levels were negatively 
affected by increased import penetration, the change in these premiums was 
positively affected by it. Increased export orientation again had a negative 
impact on the change in the Institutional Factors Premium.
In Tables 6 and 7 we include other aspects of job quality, specifically 
whether the job is stable or not, whether the job involves underemploy-
ment (less than 40 hours per week) or over-employment (more than 40 
hours per week), the commute time, and the work place characteristics. 
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We also include wages in the index JQWWP, results reported in Table 
CC, while wages are excluded from the job quality index in Table DD, 
JQWWP2. Most conclusions using the Institutional Factors Premiums as 
dependent variable hold for these two more comprehensive indices. We 
still see an insignificant effect for tariffs. Import penetration levels have 
a negative impact on job quality premiums in 2006, while the change in 
import penetration has a positive impact on the change in these premi-
ums. Export orientation levels do not have a significant negative impact on 
these job quality premiums however, while the change in export orienta-
tion still has a negative impact on the changes in these premiums between 
1998 and 2006. Finally, percent female and changes in feminization levels 
have very strong negative impacts on these two job quality premiums. 
Table 6: Effect of Trade Policy on the Job Quality Premiums for All Wage Workers
Dependent Variable: Job Quality Wage Workers Premium (JQWWP) or Change in JQWWP, 
Weighted Least Squares Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent 
Variable
JQWWP JQWWP JQWWP JQWWP
Change in 
JQWWP
Change in 
JQWWP
Tariff 0.708 0.510 -0.094 -0.767 0.419 0.270
(0.903) (0.734) (0.554) (0.487) (0.659) (0.548)
Import 
penetration
0.557 -0.399** -0.134 0.588*
(0.346) (0.187) (0.276) (0.301)
Export orientation -0.283 -0.260 -0.097 -0.341*
(0.224) (0.413) (0.299) (0.172)
% Female -0.934** -0.969** -0.527** -0.903*** -0.929***
(0.355) (0.439) (0.234) (0.191) (0.213)
Unionization 0.134 0.141 0.422 0.188 0.146
(0.337) (0.354) (0.266) (0.247) (0.261)
Skilled: % with 
secondary + 
education
-0.232 -0.544 -0.162 -0.273 -0.509
(0.475) (0.538) (0.215) (0.280) (0.316)
Blue collar 0.435 0.368 -0.189 0.507 0.475
(0.474) (0.450) (0.300) (0.364) (0.330)
Change in export 
orientation
0.300
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(0.411)
Industry and time 
indicators
yes yes no no no no
JQWWP regressed 
on changes 
no no no yes no no
First differences no no no no yes yes
Observations 40 40 20 20 21 21
R-squared 0.907 0.920 0.330 0.356 0.492 0.561
Table 7: Effect of Trade Policy on the Job Quality Premiums Excluding Wages for All Wage 
Workers 
Dependent Variable: Job Quality Wage Workers Premium excluding wages (JQWWP2) or 
Change in JQWWP2, Weighted Least Squares Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent 
Variable
JQWWP2 JQWWP2 JQWWP2 JQWWP2
Change in 
JQWWP2
Change in 
JQWWP2
Tariff 0.766 0.510 -0.017 -0.759* 0.480 0.272
(1.005) (0.860) (0.510) (0.415) (0.728) (0.577)
Import 
penetration
0.595 -0.383* -0.148 0.716**
(0.350) (0.185) (0.248) (0.309)
Export 
orientation
-0.357 -0.314 -0.248 -0.463**
(0.275) (0.380) (0.258) (0.209)
% Female -0.881** -0.928** -0.545** -0.863*** -0.899***
(0.369) (0.423) (0.228) (0.201) (0.210)
Unionization 0.173 0.202 0.411 0.187 0.146
(0.367) (0.354) (0.243) (0.255) (0.244)
Skilled: % with 
secondary + 
education
-0.218 -0.542 -0.185 -0.240 -0.527*
(0.482) (0.476) (0.206) (0.275) (0.273)
Blue collar 0.439 0.372 -0.146 0.495 0.462
(0.503) (0.478) (0.281) (0.391) (0.345)
Change 
in export 
orientation
0.192
(0.369)
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Industry and 
time indicators
yes yes no no no no
JQWWP2 
regressed on 
changes 
no no no yes no no
First differences no no no no yes yes
Observations 40 40 20 20 21 21
R-squared 0.905 0.920 0.345 0.381 0.465 0.570
6. Conclusion
This paper employs a newly available panel labor market survey 
to investigate the impact of trade openness on wage and job quality 
outcomes in Egyptian manufacturing over the period of rapid trade liber-
alization between 1998 and 2006. Egypt’s concerted efforts to liberalize 
a highly restrictive trade regime since the early 1990s, has resulted in 
substantial reduction in both nominal and effective protection in almost 
all manufacturing sector industries. Direct measures of trade openness 
and protection are employed in the analysis by merging labor market 
survey data at the two-digit industry level with trade variables that cap-
ture export orientation, import penetration as well as the more direct 
measure of policy changes: changes in tariffs levels. We employ the inter-
industry wage differentials approach to determine whether workers in 
less heavily protected industries have lower wages or job quality than 
workers of similar observable characteristics in the more heavily pro-
tected industries.  
Several conclusions can be drawn from this analysis. First, institu-
tional factors of job quality (social security, medical insurance, a contract, 
paid casual leave, paid sick leave, and whether the worker is a member 
of a trade union) seem to have the strongest correlation with the trade 
variables and the industry specific characteristics used in the analysis 
since adding additional aspects of job quality, including wages and num-
ber of hours, does not change the main conclusions. Second, tariffs do 
not seem to have had a significant impact on either wages or job qual-
ity over this period. Third, increased export orientation may have had a 
positive impact on wages, but has had a significant negative impact on all 
job quality indices in many specifications. As far as we know, this result is 
unique to this study since we use both wages and job quality as indicators 
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of “worker well-being”, unlike most other studies in the literature that 
focus on wages alone, and many find export orientation to positively 
affect wages, as we do, yet do not complement the picture by exploring 
the other non-wage aspects of worker well-being, as measured by our job 
quality indices. Finally, industries with the highest import penetration lev-
els in 2006 also had the lowest job quality, but those that had the largest 
increase in import penetration actually also saw the largest improvements 
in job quality. This underlines the clear distinction between wage and job 
quality outcomes and highlights the importance of studying the impact of 
liberalization on these two variables separately. These conclusions are in-
line with the literature that has found that increased trade liberalization 
is associated with increased informality, which is one aspect of low job 
quality, in several developing countries, even as the effect on wages has 
been ambiguous, depending on the country and period under study. 
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Table A1: Inter-Industry Wage and Job Quality Premiums, 1998
Wage 
Premium
Institutional 
Factors 
Premium
JQIWW 
Premium
JQIWW2 
Premium
Tobacco Manufacturing -0.243 0.090 0.129 0.156
Textiles Manufacturing -0.176 0.163 0.193 0.231
Garment Manufacturing -0.071 -0.194 0.033 0.048
Leather Goods 
Manufacturing
-0.117 -0.225 0.104 0.046
Wood Product 
Manufacturing (except 
furniture)
0.075 -0.253 -0.746 -0.750
Paper Manufacturing -0.313 0.317 0.272 0.333
Publishing and Printing 
Manufacturing
0.124 0.154 0.132 0.091
Coke and Petroleum 
Products Manufacturing
0.255 0.251 0.242 0.196
Chemical Product 
Manufacturing
0.053 0.338 0.274 0.278
Rubber Product 
Manufacturing
-0.265 0.383 0.120 0.162
Non-metallic Mineral 
Manufacturing
0.057 -0.056 0.038 0.040
Basic Metal 
Manufacturing
0.108 0.429 0.256 0.246
Metallic Products 
Manufacturing (except 
machinery and 
equipment)
-0.060 -0.106 -0.019 -0.079
Machinery and 
Equipment (Others) 
Manufacturing
0.007 0.053 0.049 0.055
Office Equipment, 
Computer Manufacturing, 
Electrical Equipment 
(Others) Manufacturing
0.147 0.258 0.310 0.288
Radio, Television 
and Communication 
Equipment 
Manufacturing 
0.020 0.072 -0.017 -0.002
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Medical Equipment 
Manufacturing
0.175 0.622 0.294 0.290
Motorized Vehicle 
Manufacturing
0.086 0.103 0.253 0.234
Other Transport 
Equipment 
Manufacturing
-0.024 0.009 0.071 0.088
Furniture Manufacturing 0.164 -0.263 -0.277 -0.286
Table A2: Inter-Industry Wage and Job Quality Premiums, 2006
Wage 
Premium
Institutional 
Factors 
Premium
JQIWW 
Premium
JQIWW2 
Premium
Tobacco Manufacturing -0.057 0.516 0.420 0.411
Textiles Manufacturing -0.203 0.215 0.150 0.169
Garment Manufacturing -0.119 -0.053 0.087 0.091
Leather Goods 
Manufacturing
-0.209 -0.202 -0.033 -0.005
Wood Product 
Manufacturing
(except furniture)
0.027 -0.282 -0.402 -0.406
Paper Manufacturing -0.086 -0.018 0.098 0.108
Publishing and Printing 
Manufacturing
0.070 0.227 0.090 0.088
Coke and Petroleum 
Products Manufacturing
0.603 0.214 0.177 0.079
Chemical Product 
Manufacturing
-0.082 0.069 0.067 0.073
Rubber Product 
Manufacturing
-0.202 0.412 0.006 0.023
Non-metallic Mineral 
Manufacturing
-0.010 -0.017 0.034 0.048
Basic Metal 
Manufacturing
0.223 0.254 0.263 0.223
Metallic Products 
Manufacturing
(except machinery and 
equipment)
-0.076 -0.237 0.017 0.035
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Machinery and 
Equipment (Others) 
Manufacturing
-0.094 0.213 0.157 0.177
Office Equipment, 
Computer Manufacturing, 
Electrical Equipment 
(Others) Manufacturing
-0.093 0.188 -0.001 0.006
Radio, Television 
and Communication 
Equipment 
Manufacturing 
0.075 0.266 0.236 0.248
Medical Equipment 
Manufacturing
-0.006 0.240 -0.072 -0.081
Motorized Vehicle 
Manufacturing
0.023 0.308 0.206 0.214
Other Transport 
Equipment 
Manufacturing
-0.198 -0.301 -0.147 -0.125
Furniture Manufacturing 0.197 -0.252 -0.039 -0.057
Table A3: Spearman Rank Correlation between Wage and Job Quality Premiums, 1998
Wage 
Premium
Institutional 
Factors 
Premium
JQWW 
Premium
JQWW2 
Premium
Wage Premium 1
Institutional Factors 
Premium 0.1053 1
(-0.6587)
JQWW Premium 0.1835 0.8586* 1
(-0.4388) (0)
JQWW2 Premium 0.0571 0.8887* 0.9699* 1
(-0.8109) (0) (0)
P-values in parentheses. * indicates significant at the 1% level. 
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Table A4: Spearman Rank Correlation between Wage and Job Quality Premiums, 2006
Wage 
Premium
Institutional 
Factors 
Premium
JQWW 
Premium
JQWW2 
Premium
Wage Premium 1
Institutional Factors 
Premium 0.2015 1
(0.3943)
JQWW Premium 0.2842 0.6737* 1
(0.2246) (0.0011)
JQWW2 Premium 0.1699 0.6496* 0.9744* 1
(0.4738) (0.0019) (0)
P-values in parentheses. * indicates significant at the 1% level. 
